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A Dilemma, A Catholic Response, 
A Zen Response
Douglas Mikkelson
Are duties of filial piety to be overridden in favor of those of 
religion?
—Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae q.101.41 
Following an evening talk, EjO [a monk] asked: ‘Must we fulfill our 
obligations to our parents?*
—DOgen, ShdbOgenzO Zuimonki, II. 192
AS CHRISTOPHER Gowans defines it, “ a moral dilemma is a situa­tion in which an agent S morally ought to do A and morally ought 
to do B but cannot do both, either because B is just-not-doing-A or be­
cause some contingent feature of the world prevents doing both?’3 The 
questions above point us to one potential version of a moral dilemma: 
the prospect of a conflict of obligations dictated by the religious life ver­
sus the natural obligations children owe to their parents. (So expressed, 
the form of this moral dilemma can also be identified as a * ‘conflict of 
obligations” problem.) Both DOgen and Thomas Aquinas present reso­
lutions to this dilemma. I offer here a comparative analysis of their 
viewpoints because I believe they are notable in their similarity of ap­
proach as well as in the ultimate difference in their answers.
* Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theo log iae (London: Blackfriars, 1964). Citations 
of the Summa employed in this article are based on the method used in the Blackfriars 
translation. Thus 2a2ae q.101.4 Rely Four refers to question 101, article 4, Reply Four 
o f the secunda secundae (i.e., second half o f  Part II) o f  the Summa. A  “ Reply”  is 
Aquinas" reply to one o f  the “ Opinions” that Aquinas presents; this is to be distin-
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In answer to EjO’s query, DOgen replies:
Filial piety is most important, but there is a difference be­
tween laymen and monks. Laymen, relying on such works as 
The Classic o f  Filial Piety, take care of their parents during 
their lifetimes and hold services for them after their deaths. 
Monks, on the other hand, have severed their ties with the 
world and live in the religious realm. Thus their obligations 
are not limited to parents alone, but, feeling these obligations 
to all beings, they fill the world with good deeds. If they were 
merely to limit their obligations to their parents, they would 
be turning against the religious way. True filial piety consists 
in following Buddhism in everyday practice and in each mo­
ment of study under a Zen Master . . . .  Zen monks must un­
derstand the deep obligation they bear their parents in the 
above terms. Does selecting just one day for doing good and 
holding services for just one person really reflect the spirit of 
Buddhism? (11.19)
The opening sentence of DOgen’s answer bears a strong resemblance 
to the opening sentence found in Reply 4 to the question from the Sum-
guished from Aquinas' own “ Answer”  (responsio) to the question. Whenever possi­
ble, I have tried to conform my translation to the Blackfriars translation. However, my 
own interpretive perspective has led me to differ with this and other translations on cer­
tain points. Thus I must take fu ll responsibility for all translations from Latin to En­
glish in the article.
2 Cf. ReihO Masunaga, A Primer o f  Soto Zen: A  Translation o f  Dbgen’s Shobo- 
genzO Zuimonki (Honolulu: University Press o f Hawaii, 1971), 11.19. I have adopted 
the citation method employed by Masunaga. Thus 11.19 refers to chapter two, section 
19 o f the ShObbgenzb Zuimonki.
In order to avoid a cumbersome proliferation o f footnotes, I have decided to include 
all citations o f the Summa and the ShObOgenzb Zuimonki within the text o f the article 
itself. Citations o f these texts usually appear directly after a quotation or paraphrase, 
but in instances where I  make explicit reference to a passage in the course o f a sentence 
(e.g., “ whereas in 2a2ae q. 101 Reply Four we read th a t. . .” ) I have let this suffice as a 
citation in order to avoid tiresome redundancy. A ll other passages quoted and para­
phrased are cited in the notes.
’  Christopher Gowans, “ Introduction: The Debate on Moral Dilemmas,”  in 
Christopher Gowans, ed.. Moral Dilemmas (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), p. 3.
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ma listed above: “ Different judgements apply to one still living the life 
of the layperson and one already professed in the religious life.” To 
the potential moral dilemma of whether or not one’s service to the 
religious life could conflict with the practice of filial piety, therefore, 
both DOgen and Aquinas identify an initial distinction between layper­
sons and people in the religious life, for which different answers apply.
According to DOgen, when one severs worldly ties, one’s concern for 
the natural resources of the world, including those of one’s family, 
must be viewed in the context of one’s status as a monk. Obligations of 
individuals in this state are not obligations to parents, but obligations 
incurred by taking the religious life. Other passages in the ShObOgenzO 
Zuimonki seem to suggest that a monk must cast aside obligations to 
family, as we see in the following: “ Students, there is an important point 
to watch when you cast aside world concerns. You must give up the 
world you have known, your family, your body, and your mind’’ (1.21). 
In a similar fashion, Aquinas begins the last paragraph of 2a2ae 
q. 101.4 Reply Four with this statement on the matter: “ Because he is 
counted as dead to the world, one already professed in the religious life 
should not for the sake of his parents* support leave the cloister where 
he is buried together with Christ and become involved again in secular 
affairs.”
But neither DOgen nor Aquinas absolutely forbade a monk’s partici­
pation in secular affairs. Suppose, DOgen remarks to his monks, some­
one asks you for a letter assisting him regarding some mundane affair. 
DOgen observes that “ if considered carefully in terms of the time and 
occasion,”  and one’s motive is to bring benefits to others, it is in accor­
dance with following the True Way (1.19). And as Aquinas states in 
another section of the Summa, monks are focused on striving toward 
and giving themselves to God, but “ if the need of their neighbor de­
mands it, they should involve themselves in their affairs out of chari­
ty,”  given the permission of their superiors (2a2ae q. 187.2, Answer). 
Applied to the matter of obligations to parents, Aquinas states: “ Still, 
within the limits of obedience to superiors, he is bound to expend every 
effort towards improving his parent’s state” (2a2ae q.101.4 Reply 4).
This qualifier is consistent with an earlier assertion in the Answer of 
2a2ae q.101.4: “ Whenever we are not held back from homage to God 
by the filial duties owed to parents, these remain an act of the virtue of 
filial piety.” Those leading the religious life can, and must, exercise fili-
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al piety and its attendant obligations within the limits o f their state. 
But according to Aquinas, children can provide not only material, but 
also spiritual, support. As he asserts in 2a2ae 189.6 Reply One:
The commandment to honor one’s parents extends not only 
to material but to spiritual help and to showing proper 
respect. Hence even those in the religious life can fulfil the 
precept of honoring one’s parents by praying for them, by giv­
ing them respect and help in accordance with their state as 
religious. Those who live in the world also honor their par­
ents, but in a different way, according to their state.
Just as Aquinas provides the means by which a monk can and should 
exercise filial piety, DOgen’s response to EjO’s question about filial obli­
gations explains how the Buddhist monk exercises filial piety. Note the 
ingenuity of his response: the monk’s obligations extend beyond par­
ents to all sentient beings. Rather than preempting filial piety in the 
name of Buddhism, Ddgen insists that the meeting of these obligations 
is the exercise of true  filial piety.
As Hajime Nakamura notes, in the Japanese “ way of thinking”  the 
family is “ the dominant unit of social organization with a limited so­
cial nexus. Filial piety, therefore, while perhaps present to some extent 
in any culture, occupies a prominent place in the Japanese social 
consciousness.” 4 For the average Japanese person, then, the sense of 
obligation to one’s family is quite strong. Thus the impact of EjO’s 
question is very serious. DOgen does not make a frontal assault on fami­
ly obligations; evidently he is well aware he would have little hope for 
success, given the premiere position the family enjoys in the Japanese 
ethos. Rather, he brings forth a broader Buddhist moral vision by in­
troducing the notion of “ true filial piety.”
DOgen’s answer, in effect, suggests a resolution o f a dilemma implicit 
in EjO’s question, the potential conflict between obligations o f filial pie­
ty and obligations incurred by leading the religious life. In his view, the 
meeting of the obligations o f the monk is none other than meeting the 
obligations of true filial piety. Furthermore, for the monk the obliga­
tions of true filial piety ought to take precedence over the natural obli-
4 Hajime Nakamura, Ways o f  Thinking o f  Eastern Peoples (Honolulu: The Univer­
sity o f  Hawaii Press, 1975), pp. 413 and 439.
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gations of filial piety which are of such great concern to the laity. Gener­
ally speaking, therefore, DOgen seems to be suggesting that in the case 
of the type of moral dilemma described above, there is a hierarchy of 
obligations operative in the resolution of the problem for those who 
are leading the religious life. A passage in Aquinas’ answer offers a 
striking parallel to what we have seen of DOgen’s perspective so far. 
Aquinas contends that “ due circumstances” must be taken into ac­
count when one addresses this question, and
if one should fail to attend to any of these the act will no lon­
ger be virtuous but sinful. Consequently attendance to the 
duties and homage owed to parents is marked by the measure 
called for. This measure does not press a person to be more 
intent upon concern for parents than upon honoring god; 
rather, following the words of Ambrose, ‘piety in serving 
God takes precedence over the demands of our own flesh and 
blood.’ It follows that if homage towards our parents should 
draw us away from the service of God, to persist would not be 
an act of filial piety. Hence Jerome’s words, ‘Rally to the ban­
ner of the cross and step over even a prostrate father or 
mother. Cruelty of this sort is the highest form of filial piety? 
In such circumstances, then, obligations of filial piety are to 
be set aside for the sake of the duties of religion (2a2ae 
q.101.4 Answer).
Akin to DOgen’s response to his own question, in this passage Aqui­
nas seems to suggest that a hierarchy of obligations is operative in 
resolving the dilemma. Furthermore, just as DOgen spoke of meeting 
the obligations of the religious life as exercising true filial piety, Aqui­
nas speaks of the meeting of the obligations to religion as “ the highest 
form of filial piety.” These obligations, we see, take precedence over 
the demands of flesh and blood, i.e., the obligations of “ common”  fili­
al piety. At this point, however, we should recall a point made earlier: 
both Aquinas and DOgen believe that the answer to this conflict of obli­
gations problem is different for people in the religious life than for lay­
persons. So far, we have provided a partial analysis of how DOgen 
answered this question for Buddhist monks. The parallel thinking not­
ed in Aquinas above, however, is a more general response to the ques­
tion, and is not merely directed to Christian monks. As we see, Aqui-
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nas qualifies his response to the moral dilemma we have described not 
only based on the distinction between the religious and the lay person, 
but also on the entire circumstances of the given situation. So, it 
should now be added, does Ddgen, as a further review of his thinking 
will reveal.
In fact, neither Ddgen nor Aquinas offers a rigid hierarchy of obliga­
tions that covers all potential cases of conflict. Even in the one version 
under consideration—the conflict of obligations between filial piety 
and the religious life—no absolute hierarchical relationship exists for 
either Ddgen or Aquinas. In any given situation of conflict, only a 
knowledge of due circumstances can enable the proper resolution to 
the problem.
Thus we should guard ourselves from reifying what we have learned 
so far about Ddgen and Aquinas' responses to this form of moral 
dilemma. An efficacious way to understand further their thinking on 
this topic would be to pursue how this hierarchical schema of obliga­
tions would function in actual test cases of conflict. Fortunately for us, 
a passage from Ddgen’s ShobOgenzO Zuimonki provides just such a 
test case, to which we shall soon turn. But setting the proper conditions 
for the test will first require some additional insight into the thought of 
Aquinas pertaining to this matter.
Before proceeding, a few major points deserve restatement and sum­
marization. Recall that we have been concerned with the moral dilem­
ma resulting from the conflict of obligations to parents versus those 
incurred by leading the religious life. So far, we have noted that Ddgen 
and Aquinas seem to see a hierarchy of obligations as operative in the 
resolution of this dilemma; furthermore, the duties of filial piety are, 
generally speaking, to be superseded by a higher set of obligations to 
the religious life, which can be transformed in our understanding to 
being obligations of a “ higher” (Aquinas) or “ true*’ (Ddgen) filial 
piety. Yet this obligation hierarchy is no absolute calculus. In any par­
ticular case, due circumstances must be taken into account—which cer­
tainly includes, though by no means is limited to, whether or not the 
person in question is a monk or a layperson.
Now, with the benefit of Aquinas, let us now set out one possible set 
of circumstances. In the course of his reply to the question posed at the 
beginning of this article (are duties of filial piety to be overridden in 
favor of those of religion?), Aquinas addresses the issue in the context
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of a person who seeks to “ enter the religious life.*’ Given a person of 
this status, the form of the moral dilemma must now be stated in this 
form: a conflict of obligations owed to parents versus those incurred by 
entering the religious life. The question becomes, in Aquinas’ words, 
“ (whether or not] it is right to let care of parents give way to a fuller 
dedication to religion” (2a2ae q. 101.4 Reply Three).
Articulating Aquinas’ answer to this question requires reference not 
only to 2a2ae q.101.4, but also 2a2ae q. 189.6, which addresses the 
same issue. In the former, he states: “ If laypersons have parents who 
are unable to sustain themselves without them, they must not abandon 
them in order to enter a religious order; that would be breaking the 
commandment on honoring parents.” That this is not just a moral obli­
gation, but is dictated by ecclesiastic law, Aquinas acknowledges in the 
latter section: “ Therefore if parents are in such need that they cannot 
be properly supported except by the help of parents, it is not lawful for 
the children to neglect the support of their parents and enter the 
religious life.”
Aquinas, however, holds this approach as correct only in the in­
stance of grave necessity, for “ if parents can manage without him, it is 
permitted for such a person to leave them and enter the religious life; 
children are obliged to the support of parents only in cases of existing 
need” (2a2ae q.101.4, Reply Four). Furthermore, a child past the age 
of puberty is not bound by parental will regarding state of life. Finally, 
a child is allowed to enter into the religious life when others are availa­
ble to support parents, as we learn in the following observation: 
“ Hence we read in Matthew and Luke that the Lord had reprimanded 
the disciple who was unwilling to follow him immediately because of 
his father’s burial, since ‘there were others who would see to this,’ as 
Chrysostom says”  (2a2ae q. 189.6, Answer).
Later compilations of canon law (largely indebted to Aquinas on this 
subject) have spoken of the obstacles which prevent one from entering 
the religious life, and this is a helpful way to interpret what we have 
learned so far about Aquinas. From his viewpoint, the right to enter 
the religious life is suspended for as long as the situation of the grave 
necessity of a parent lasts, provided that a person 1) actually has the 
capability of giving assistance; 2) can only do so outside of the religious 
life; and 3) cannot turn to a brother or sister to provide the necessary as­
sistance. (A fourth criterion found in later canon law might be added
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here: A child, in assisting parents, would incur more danger to him­
self/herself than the danger faced by the parents in need. Though not ex­
plicitly stated by Aquinas, it would seem to be a logical extension of his 
thinking on the matter.)3 These criteria apply, we should recall, to 
those who are of sufficient age not to be bound by parental will on the 
matter. An aspirant finding himself/herself in this situation is said to 
be in a state of impediment.
Let us now review the relevant points. Aquinas envisions a situation 
whereby there is a potential conflict of obligation for the aspirant to 
the religious life. He then articulates the conditions whereby such an in­
dividual would be “ impeded”  from entering the religious life, as encap­
sulated by the paragraph above. Under these circumstances, therefore, 
the resolution of the problem is clear: the obligations of filial piety take 
precedence.
Sufficient groundwork has been accomplished to enable us to resume 
our comparative analysis. We can now introduce the test case from the 
ShObOgenzO Zuimonki promised earlier:
On another occasion a monk said: ‘I am an only child, and 
my aged mother is still alive. She lives on what I am able to 
send her. We are deeply attached to each other, and my filial 
loyalties are strong. So, by compromising slightly with the 
world and its people, I can provide food and clothing for my 
mother through the support of others. If I were to renounce 
the world and live alone, my mother would have difficulty liv­
ing even for one day. Thus, while participating in the ordina­
ry world, I am distressed that I cannot enter wholeheartedly 
into Buddhism. If there is a principle that would make it possi­
ble to abandon the world and enter Buddhism, would you 
explain it to me?’ (III. 14).
Before we proceed further, we should note that the petitioner is iden­
tified as “ a monk.” Thus he presumably is, to some limited extent, 
“ leading the religious life.” But his case is still instructive, because he 
is an aspirant who wishes to know if, under the stated circumstances, 
he could “ enter wholeheartedly into Buddhism.”  Just as Aquinas envi-
5 Cf. Dictionaire de D roit Canonique (Paris: Librarie Letouzey et Anc, 1953), s.v. 
“ Empechments d ’Enter en Religion.”
166
MIKKELSON: ON ENTERING THE RELIGIOUS LIFE
sions a situation where an individual seeks to abandon the world and 
enter the Christian religious life, so does this man seek to know if he 
could “ abandon the world and enter Buddhism.”  As with Aquinas, 
the issue in question is whether or not such an act is permissible given 
one’s filial obligations to parents. Besides, Ddgen himself answers the 
question in terms of a son “ leaving home to become a monk,” as we 
shall soon see. So we would do better to simply think of the aspirant as 
a man who wishes, as we saw Aquinas express it, “ to let care of parents 
give way to a fuller dedication to religion.”
Now imagine, for a moment, that the man is not petitioning Ddgen, 
but Aquinas, about wholeheartedly entering into the religious life. (Im­
agine also that the word “ Buddhism” in the above passage is actually 
“ Christianity.” )  What would be Aquinas’ judgement? Let us review 
the facts of the case in light of the criteria for a state of impediment list­
ed above. Obviously the man is of sufficient age to make a decision to 
enter the religious life without parental consent. The case is one of 
grave necessity, since the man’s mother, without his support, would 
have difficulty living for even one day. The son has demonstrated his 
ability to assist his mother, and doing so would not endanger his life to 
any significant degree. He knows he could not continue to support his 
mother were he to wholeheartedly renounce the world and enter into 
the religious life. Unfortunately, being an only child, he cannot turn 
the task of supporting her over to a brother or sister. Furthermore, his 
own acknowledgement of his strong filial loyalties suggests that he him­
self recognizes the natural obligations one has to parents.
As we see, each criterion for the state of impediment is present in this 
case. Therefore, it would seem Aquinas’ judgement would be rather 
easy to predict. He would rule that, as long as the circumstances 
remain unaltered, the man will be in a state of impediment. Were there 
a change in the circumstances—e.g., if he could find some means to pro­
vide for his mother other than forsaking the religious life and doing it 
himself—then the state of impediment would be removed, and the man 
would no long be prohibited from abandoning the world and entering 
the religious life.
So much for Aquinas. Now let us see how Ddgen himself responded 
to this situation. He begins his response to the man’s question as fol­
lows: “ If, after serious consideration, you still have the earnest desire 
to enter into Buddhism fully and can work out some means to assure
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the comfort and livelihood of your mother, then it would be a good 
thing to enter Buddhism, both for your mother and yourself ”  (III. 14). 
We can well imagine that DOgen’s initial reaction easily could have 
been that of Aquinas: if the man changes the circumstances by provid­
ing for his mother, then he will be able to wholeheartedly enter the 
religious life. Perhaps, one might surmise, Ddgen sees the man as being 
in what Aquinas would call a state of impediment. This would be a sen­
sible interpretation based on what we’ve seen so far—but then DOgen 
later goes on to say:
This is a difficult problem, not for others to decide. If you 
renounce this life and enter Buddhism, your aged mother 
might starve to death. But would not the merit of having per­
mitted a son to enter Buddhism establish a good cause for 
gaining the Way in the future? If you cast aside the filial love 
and duty you have not discarded over numerous kalpas and 
many lives in this life when you have been born in the body of 
a man and have had the rare opportunity to encounter Bud­
dhism, this would be the mark of one who is truly grateful. 
How can this not accord with the Buddha’s will? It is said 
that if one son leaves his home to become a monk, seven 
generations of parents will gain the Way. How can you afford 
to waste an opportunity for eternal peace because of concern 
for the body in this present fleeting life? Think this over well 
for yourselves (III. 14).
Taken in its entirety, DOgen’s answer may strike us at first glance as 
somewhat ambiguous. What is the man being instructed to do?
Understanding DOgen’s answer requires us first of all to understand 
what DOgen sees as “ the due circumstances.” DOgen agrees with Aqui­
nas that in order to provide a resolution for this moral dilemma, one 
must take into account one’s filial obligations, and one’s capability to 
fulfill them. Aquinas, in return, would agree with DOgen’s observation 
about the merit that would accrue from a son entering the religious life 
for both himself, his parents, and others. As 2a2ae 189.6 observes, the 
religious life enables one to extend spiritual help to one’s parents, and 
furthermore contributes especially to the good of humankind. But DO­
gen makes an additional point: “ How can you afford to waste an op­
portunity for eternal peace because of a concern for the body in this
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present fleeting life?”  From DOgen’s perspective, there is a crucial 
point about the due circumstances of this case which must not be over­
looked, a point DOgen expresses distinctly in another passage of the 
ShObOgenzO Zuimonki: “ Impermanence is a fact before our eyes” 
(11.14). DOgen continually introduces the doctrine of impermanence in 
the ShbbbgenzO Zuimonki, stressing how this “ fact”  highlights the ur­
gency of following the Way. So DOgen points out to the man that he 
has the opportunity to enter more fully into Buddhism and “ cast aside 
the filial love and duty you have not discarded over numerous kalpas.”
For DOgen, then, impermanence is one of the facts of the case at 
hand, a relevant—indeed important—circumstance one must take into 
account in arriving at a decision. DOgen does, in the end, exhort the 
man to abandon the world and enter Buddhism. In this case, therefore, 
it does seem he is suggesting the man’s filial duties ought to be set aside 
in favor of incurring and fulfilling the obligations of the religious life.
But if this is how DOgen thinks this conflict of obligations problem 
should be resolved in this situation, why does he begin his answer by 
stressing that “ This is a difficult problem, not for others to decide,” 
and end his answer with the remark: “ Think this over well for your­
selves” ? Why does he not simply tell the man what’s what, and then 
pressure him to act accordingly?
To answer this question, we must note DOgen’s employment of upa- 
ya, “ skill in means."Upaya refers to the advancing of the student’s 
understanding via the pedagogical method most suited to the present 
stage of advancement and capacity for growth of the individual, as the 
master perceives it. For DOgen, right action in this or any other situa­
tion is not ultimately a matter of rule-following, but is a function of 
the individual’s actualization of the Buddha-nature, varying according 
to the due circumstances of each concrete situation and the capacity of 
the individual to act. The man has posed a practical conflict that re­
quires resolution here and now, and DOgen does not flinch from the 
challenge. So initially he tells the man he must assess whether he has (or 
can obtain) the necessary desire, and if so then to provide for his 
mother’s needs before entering Buddhism. Evidently DOgen sees this 
answer as an appropriate one, given his assessment of the man’s state 
of religious attainment.
But after providing a resolution to the man’s problem, he then offers 
some instruction which he hopes will spur him towards a higher under-
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standing. If indeed the man truly understood the circumstances in their 
entirety, especially the fact of impermanence, he would realize the im­
mediate importance of his entering Buddhism without delay, and act 
accordingly. This action would be none other than acting from the 
Buddha-nature, one of the “ free and pure activities in accordance with 
circumstances and occasions,” as Hee-Jin Kim aptly states.6 From the 
perspective of this greater level of understanding, undertaking the 
obligations of the religious life ought to take precedence over those of 
filial piety.
We ought also to note in Ddgen’s answer an implicit acknowledge­
ment of the value-force of obligations to one’s parents. Again we see a 
tension between the Japanese stress on a limited social nexus and a 
broader Buddhist moral vision, and again we see DOgen seeking to per­
suade the listener not by denying filial piety, but by transforming 
religious obligations in light of this idea. What, after all, is the clinch­
ing argument? “ It is said that if one son leaves his home to become a 
monk, seven generations of parents will gain the way.” DOgen is invok­
ing here an idea we considered earlier: a “ higher”  or “ true”  filial 
piety. Once again, he suggests one can understand the obligations one 
incurs in the religious life as being none other than the obligations of 
true filial piety. From this high level understanding, the obligations of 
true filial piety take precedence.
To recount, then, the judgements in this case: Aquinas would believe 
the man is in a state of impediment, and thus cannot enter the religious 
life. DOgen takes the view that the problem is a difficult one, but the 
man could still enter the religious life. Perhaps it would be accurate to 
say that in this case, Aquinas would rule that the man is prohibited 
from carrying out the obligations a dedication to the religious life 
would incur, and required to attend to his filial duties toward his 
mother. DOgen, on the other hand, would allow, and even encourage, 
the man to carry out his obligations to the religious life over those of 
filial piety, given a sufficient level of understanding in the man’s Bud­
dhist practice; if the man’s level of attainment were of a lower order, 
however, DOgen would concede the validity of granting precedence to 
the obligations of filial piety.
6 Hee-Jin Kim, DOgen Kigen—Mystical Realist (Tucson: The University of Arizona 
Press, 1975), 288.
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In sum, we have seen, to some extent, how DOgen and Aquinas 
would respond to a certain kind of conflict of obligations problem. 
Both would seek to resolve the problem via the application of a hierar­
chy of obligations to this scenario—a common means of resolving this 
form of moral dilemma—but insist that a proper resolution requires 
reference to the due circumstances as well. Part of the difference in the 
answers DOgen and Aquinas would offer in any given case would partly 
depend on their perception of what exactly the relevant due circum­
stances were. Any exhaustive treatment of the differences in their an­
swers would, of course, require a consideration of many other matters: 
finer points of doctrine, social mores, and so forth. But at least in the 
case reviewed above, we gain some insight into how they would go 
about the matter. They are both, I would add, resolutions which are at 
once pragmatic and exhortative. They are pragmatic because they seek 
to provide a plan of action for the religious seeker which takes into ac­
count the realities and capabilities of the parties involved. They are ex­
hortative because they seek to stress the importance and superiority of 
the religious life, and encourage the pursuit of it to the fullest extent 
possible.
171
